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OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal involves a bitter fee dispute between lawyers John Peoples and
Howard Langer that was borne out of the settlement of an antitrust class action.  See In re
Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 619 (E.D. Pa. 2004).  The orders at issue
were entered by the District Court on July 15, 2008 (First Order) and October 3, 2008
(Second Order).  Langer challenges both orders while Peoples appeals only the Second
Order.  For the reasons that follow, we find Peoples’s appeal entirely without merit.  As
for Langer’s appeal, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the case to the
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
The long and arduous history of this dispute was explained in detail by the District
Court in a memorandum accompanying its First Order, In re Linerboard Antitrust
Litigation, 2008 WL 2758442 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2008).  Accordingly, we shall recount
only the facts and procedural history relevant to these appeals.
3The Linerboard class action—which originated from multiple cases filed in Illinois
and Pennsylvania—was transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, docketed as MDL 1261, and assigned to the Honorable Jan E.
DuBois.  The Linerboard settlement yielded approximately $60 million in attorneys’ fees,
and Judge DuBois appointed Langer as liaison counsel to assist with the fee allocation
among class counsel.  Liaison counsel was charged with administrative duties such as
receiving orders and notices from the Court and circulating them among other counsel in
the class, and maintaining files of all documents served upon them so they would be
available to all lawyers within the group.  See Order of July 14, 2008, In re Linerboard
Antitrust Litig., No. 98-05055 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2008) (quoting Judge DuBois’s Practices
and Procedures Order of October 4, 2000 ¶ 7); Manual for Complex Litigation § 20.22
(3d) (providing examples of typical liaison counsel duties including “communications
between the court and other counsel . . . convening meetings of counsel, advising parties
of developments in the case, and otherwise assisting in the coordination of activities and
positions.”).  On June 4, 2004, the District Court amended its order of June 2, 2004
awarding counsel fees to include language retaining jurisdiction over the fee allocation
and any related disputes.
On June 23, 2004, Peoples filed a civil action in state court, claiming that Langer
breached a contract to pay Peoples a referral fee.  After Langer removed the case to
federal court, the parties proceeded to mediation, which resulted in a settlement whereby
 Ironically, Peoples argues that the Consent Injunction is not enforceable because1
it was never docketed, even though it was kept confidential to protect his reputation.  As
stated in the Consent Injunction itself, Peoples expressly waived any argument that the
confidential nature of the order impaired its validity.  In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig.,
2008 WL 2758442, at *5 (“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that John F. Peoples waives any
right to contest the issuance of this Order and the right to contest its effect because it has
been issued but not entered.”).
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Peoples agreed to dismiss his case against Langer with prejudice in exchange for $2.94
million, which was paid “from the amount awarded as counsel fees in MDL 1261.”  In re
Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 2758442, at *3.  On July 6, 2004, Judge DuBois
entered an order pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (the All Writs
Injunction), enjoining:
all attorneys who participated in any way in MDL 1261 including, but not
limited to, John F. Peoples, Esquire . . . from taking any further action
relating to the allocation of fees in MDL 1261, or the action of liaison
counsel in connection therewith, in any court or forum other than the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Id.
Following the settlement, Peoples began making harassing telephone calls to
Langer, which prompted Langer to seek relief in federal court.  Judge DuBois first
signed—but did not enter on the docket—a stipulated temporary restraining order (TRO)
that prohibited Peoples from defaming or having any contact with Langer.  On September
8, 2005, the TRO was incorporated into an order (the Consent Injunction) which also was
signed by Judge DuBois, but not entered on the docket.1
5As time passed, Langer moved the District Court to hold Peoples in contempt for
violating the All Writs Injunction and the Consent Injunction.  In the First Order,  the
District Court denied Langer’s motion and sua sponte dissolved both injunctions (as well
as the TRO), on the belief that it would soon lose jurisdiction over the case because the
class action was winding down.  Following Langer’s motion for reconsideration, the
District Court entered the Second Order, which reinstated the All Writs Injunction, but
not the Consent Injunction.
On appeal, Peoples claims Judge DuBois erred when he (1) reinstated the All
Writs Injunction and (2) failed to recuse himself from the case.  In his cross-appeal,
Langer claims Judge Dubois erred when he: (1) dissolved the Consent Injunction without
considering the correct legal standards; and (2) denied contempt sanctions despite his
finding that Peoples violated the All Writs Injunction and the Consent Injunction.
II.
“The standard of review for the authority to issue an injunction under the Anti-
Injunction Act and the All Writs Act is de novo.”  In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales
Practice Litig., 261 F.3d 355, 363 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).  We review the terms
of an injunction for abuse of discretion, underlying questions of law de novo, and factual
determinations for clear error.  Id.  We review all other issues in the case for abuse of
discretion.  See SEC v. Warren, 583 F.2d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1978) (motion to dissolve
injunction); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 54 F.3d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 1995) (motion for
6contempt); Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999) (motion
for reconsideration); In re Antar, 71 F.3d 97, 101 (3d Cir. 1995) (recusal decision)
overruled on other grounds by Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532, 534 (3d Cir. 2001).  A
district court “abuses its discretion where its decision rests upon a clearly erroneous
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.” 
Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal
citation omitted).
III.
In his appeal from the Second Order, Peoples assigns error to the District Court’s
reinstatement of the All Writs Injunction.  Peoples argues that the District Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to enter the All Writs Injunction in the first instance, and that
there was no basis on which to reconsider its prior vacatur of the injunction.  We reject
both arguments.
A.
Under the All Writs Act, district courts “may issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions.”  28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).  This power is
limited by the Anti-Injunction Act, which prohibits a federal court from enjoining state
court proceedings “except [1] as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or [2] where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or [3] to protect or effectuate its judgments.”  28
U.S.C. § 2283.  The “in aid of jurisdiction” exception applies to preclude parallel state in
7rem proceedings and also authorizes injunctions in “consolidated multidistrict litigation,
where a parallel state court action threatens to frustrate proceedings and disrupt the
orderly resolution of the federal litigation.”  In re Prudential, 261 F.3d at 365 (citation
omitted); 17A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, AND
VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 4225 (3d ed. 2009).  This
exception typically is invoked in class actions where proceedings in state court threaten to
undermine the pending settlement of a complex MDL case, such as the one involved here. 
See Grider v. Keystone Health Plan Cent., Inc., 500 F.3d 322, 330 (3d Cir. 2007).  The
relitigation exception—which authorizes injunctions “to protect or effectuate”
judgments— “was designed to permit a federal court to prevent state litigation of an issue
that previously was presented to, and decided by, the federal court,” and has also been
invoked in class actions.  In re Prudential, 261 F.3d at 364.  In entering the All Writs
Injunction, the District Court relied on both the “in aid of jurisdiction” and relitigation
exceptions, stating the injunction was “necessary to effectuate its Order of June 2, 2004
addressing allocation of attorneys’ fees and to prevent disruption of ‘the orderly
resolution of the federal litigation.’”  In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL
2758442, at *9 (citation omitted).
Peoples emphasizes that he was not a party to the Linerboard action.  This fact,
while true, is immaterial because the District Court’s authority to enforce its injunctions
extends over non-parties.  See Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 325 (3d Cir. 1981)
8(power conferred by All Writs Act extends to non-parties who “are in a position to
frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice”). 
Peoples filed his initial fee dispute in state court in June 2004, soon after the District
Court ordered Langer to allocate fees among class counsel.  Peoples requested that the
state court escrow $6 million (10% of the Linerboard fee award) until his claims were
resolved.  Thus, Peoples’s 2004 suit against Langer directly implicated the res at issue in
the MDL case, and threatened to frustrate the orderly allocation of fees pursuant to the
District Court’s Orders of June 2 and 4, 2004.  Therefore, we hold that the District Court
had authority to issue the All Writs Injunction precluding further state court litigation
over the allocation of Linerboard fees under both the “in aid of jurisdiction” and the
relitigation exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act.
B.
Peoples next argues that the District Court erred when it granted Langer’s motion
for reconsideration and reinstated the All Writs Injunction, contending that his state court
case would not interfere with any of the District Court’s orders in Linerboard.  We reject
Peoples’s argument because his premise is flawed.
A motion for reconsideration may be granted if the movant establishes: “(1) an
intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was
not available when the court [issued the prior order]; or (3) the need to correct a clear
error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.”  Max’s Seafood Café, 176 F.3d at
9677 (citation omitted).  Here, the District Court relied on Langer’s submission of new
evidence to justify reconsideration of the First Order.
In the memorandum accompanying its Second Order, the District Court found that
reinstatement of the All Writs Injunction was necessary because Peoples “intends to
relitigate the fee dispute in state court if not enjoined from doing so,” which would
disturb the allocation of the Linerboard class counsel fee.  In re Linerboard Antitrust
Litig., 2008 WL 4461914, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2008).  This conclusion was eminently
reasonable in light of the following facts: Peoples told a newspaper reporter in July of
2008 that he was pursuing his rightful share of the Linerboard fees; on December 31,
2007, Peoples filed a subsequently-withdrawn complaint against Langer and many other
members of class counsel seeking 10% of the total fee; and in September 2008, Peoples
sought discovery regarding the allocations made to each member of the Linerboard class
counsel.  Given that the $2.94 million already received by Peoples was distributed from
the Linerboard counsel fee pool, Peoples’s attempt to relitigate his fee necessarily
threatened the allocation already approved by the District Court and justified
reinstatement of the injunction.  See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices
Litig., (Marra), 314 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming injunction under All Writs Act
where “continued litigation of these claims would ‘unsettle’ what had been thought to be
settled” and disrupt procedures approved by the district court).
 Reconsideration was also appropriate under the “error of law” prong.  In the First2
Order, the District Court mistakenly held that it would lose jurisdiction to enforce the
injunctions once the class action component of Linerboard ended, and relied upon this
conclusion in vacating the All Writs Injunction.  The District Court remedied this error of
law in its Second Order.
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Peoples contends that the “new evidence” relied on by the District Court in
granting the motion to reconsider—that Peoples intended to continue state court litigation
against Langer—could not support a motion for reconsideration because it was already
known at the time of the First Order.  This argument misstates the District Court’s
reasoning.  The new evidence was not that Peoples wanted to litigate generally, but rather
that the state court action was an attempt to relitigate the allocation of the Linerboard fee
award and not merely a personal dispute with Langer as Peoples had claimed.  Because
this fact had not been clear to the District Court until it reviewed the new evidence, its
reconsideration of the First Order was appropriate.2
IV.
In his cross-appeal, Langer claims the District Court erred when it: (1) vacated the
Consent Injunction and (2) refused to impose sanctions despite finding Peoples in
contempt of court.  We address each argument in turn.
A.
In vacating the Consent Injunction, the District Court noted that Peoples had made
only one threatening phone call in the three years since it was imposed.  After Langer
presented evidence of an additional phone call after the First Order, the Court stated in
11
the Second Order: “[t]o the extent Langer believes the latest message is threatening and
violates the law, he should report the incident to the police.”  Langer argues that the
District Court did not apply the proper legal standard for vacating an injunction.
Rule 60(b) authorizes a court to grant relief from a final judgment if “applying [the
order] prospectively is no longer equitable” or for “any other reason that justifies relief.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5), (6).  In Building and Construction Trades Council of
Philadelphia and Vicinity, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, we refused to establish “a rigid,
pervasively applicable rule” for modification of an injunction “because equity demands a
flexible response to the unique conditions of each case.”  64 F.3d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Instead, we noted factors to consider in deciding whether to modify an injunction,
including: the circumstances that led to the entry of the injunction and the nature of the
conduct sought to be prevented, the length of time since the entry of the injunction,
whether the party has complied or attempted to comply in good faith with the injunction,
and the likelihood that the conduct will recur absent the injunction.  Id.  The District
Court’s conclusion that the Consent Injunction was no longer warranted is supported by
the relevant factors.
When the Consent Injunction was entered, Peoples had left a series of ten
harassing messages on Langer’s voicemail during the time Langer was allocating the
Linerboard fee award.  The purpose of the Consent Injunction was “to prevent Peoples
from interfering with Langer’s fee allocations in MDL No. 1261,” and it was to remain in
12
effect “until the Court is satisfied that there is no longer a need for it.”  In re Linerboard
Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 2758442, at *11, *5.  The District Court vacated the Consent
Injunction on July 15, 2008 “largely because Peoples had not left another telephone
message on Langer’s voicemail since June 29, 2006, and had had no further contact with
Langer.”  In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 4461914, at *9 (internal quotation
and citation omitted).  In essence, the District Court concluded that the Consent
Injunction was no longer necessary.  Since the harassing phone calls had substantially
diminished, the Linerboard counsel fee allocation was complete, and any remaining
dispute between Langer and Peoples was primarily of a personal nature, the District Court
did not abuse its discretion when it vacated the Consent Injunction and refused to
reinstate it.
B.
On July 5, 2006, Langer filed a motion for contempt, alleging Peoples violated the
Consent Injunction by placing a phone call to Langer on June 29, 2006.  Langer sought
prospective coercive sanctions, to be imposed if and only if Peoples were to subsequently
violate the Consent Injunction.  In March and May 2007, the Court held hearings on the
contempt motion at which Peoples revealed that in 2005 he had written a letter to the
Disciplinary Board of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court complaining about Langer’s
conduct in the Linerboard fee allocation.  Peoples also testified that Langer and Judge
DuBois had an improper relationship.  Specifically, Peoples testified that Langer and
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“other individuals” led him to believe that Langer could persuade Judge DuBois to settle
the fee dispute in Langer’s favor.  Contrary to Peoples’s claim, Langer and the “other
individuals” testified unequivocally that they made no such representations to Peoples. 
On February 22, 2008, Langer filed a second motion for contempt, arguing that Peoples
had violated the All Writs Injunction by filing an action in state court regarding the
Linerboard fee allocation.  This time, Langer sought prospective conditional fines, as
well as “reasonable and fair attorneys fees for this motion” and “such further relief as this
Court deems appropriate.”
In the First Order, the District Court found Peoples knowingly violated the
Consent Injunction by virtue of the June 29, 2006 message he left on Langer’s voicemail,
and knowingly violated the All Writs Injunction on October 15, 2005 when he lodged an
unsupported complaint against Langer with the Disciplinary Board.  Despite these
violations, the District Court declined to impose sanctions, concluding that “the Court’s
jurisdiction over this dispute will end upon termination of the class action component of
MDL No. 1261 . . . .  Thus, a prospective fine would be unenforceable by this Court.”  In
re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 2758442, at *17.  Langer argues that refusing to
impose sanctions after finding that the Orders had been violated was an abuse of
discretion.
“Sanctions for civil contempt serve two purposes: ‘to coerce the defendant into
compliance with the court’s order and to compensate for losses sustained by the
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disobedience.’” Robin Woods, Inc., v. Woods, 28 F.3d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting
McDonald’s Corp. v. Victory Invs., 727 F.2d 82, 87 (3d Cir. 1984)).  The purpose of a
compensatory fine is to restore the injured party to the position he would have held had
the contemnor complied with the injunction.  Id.  Compensatory sanctions may include
the reasonable costs of prosecuting the contempt, including attorneys’ fees.  Id. (“[T]he
cost of bringing the violation to the attention of the court is part of the damages suffered
by the prevailing party”) (quoting Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 559 F.2d 270, 272 (5th
Cir. 1977)).  A district court has “wide, but not unlimited, discretion in fashioning
appropriate compensatory sanctions.”  Id. at 401.
The District Court’s authority to enforce the All Writs Injunction and the Consent
Injunction continued even after the Linerboard class action terminated.  “A district court
has the power to enforce an ongoing order against relitigation so as to protect the integrity
of a complex class settlement over which it retained jurisdiction.”  In re Prudential, 261
F.3d at 367-68.  Here, the District Court expressly retained jurisdiction over “all issues
relating to the fees and costs of counsel in this action” in its June 4, 2004 Order; under In
re Prudential, its authority to enforce the injunction continued even as the class action
was winding down.  See also Marino v. Pioneer Edsel Sales, Inc., 349 F.3d 746, 753 (4th
Cir. 2003) (district court had continuing jurisdiction to resolve a dispute as to attorneys’
fees “in order to protect the continued integrity of its order approving fair and reasonable
fees in the first instance”).  Therefore, the District Court erred when it concluded in the
 Langer claims that Peoples’s appeal of the denial of his motion to recuse is not3
properly before this Court because his notice of appeal was untimely as to the First Order
and failed to challenge the District Court’s order of October 2, 2008 denying recusal.  We
disagree because we “construe notices of appeal liberally as covering unspecified prior
orders if they are related to the specific order that was appealed from.”  Tabron v. Grace,
6 F.3d 147, 153 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993).  The Second Order was a reconsideration of the First
Order and neither the July 14 Order nor the October 2 Order denying recusal became final
until the Second Order was entered.
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First Order that it would lose jurisdiction over the case once the class action ended. 
Because the District Court relied on this erroneous conclusion of law in declining to
impose civil contempt sanctions, we will vacate that portion of the District Court’s First
Order denying Langer’s request for civil contempt sanctions, and remand for
reconsideration of Langer’s requests for attorneys fees in connection with past violations.
V.
Finally, we consider Peoples’s appeal from the District Court’s denial of his
motion to recuse and his allegations of judicial impropriety against Judge DuBois.3
In the District Court, Peoples argued that Judge DuBois had an “appearance of
bias and partiality,” arising from an alleged improper relationship with Langer.  On
appeal, Peoples cites as evidence of an appearance of bias and partiality:  (1) Langer’s
dual role as liaison counsel and litigant; (2) Peoples’s testimony that “other individuals”
told him Langer had influence over Judge DuBois; and (3) judicial acts taken by Judge
DuBois.
16
Section 455(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that a judge “shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.”  If a reasonable observer aware of all the circumstances “would harbor
doubts about the judge’s impartiality . . . then the judge must recuse.”  In re Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, (Krell), 148 F.3d 283, 343 (3d Cir.
1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  In addition, section 455(b)(1) provides
that a judge shall recuse “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,
or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” 
Generally, beliefs or opinions requiring recusal “must involve an extrajudicial factor,”
Antar, 53 F.3d at 574 (citation omitted), and “opinions formed by the judge on the basis
of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of
prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they
display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible.”  Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
Peoples’s argument, devoid of legal citation, that Langer’s role as liaison counsel
automatically created an appearance of partiality because “the Court is by definition
biased in favor of its own court-appointed surrogates, and by law gives deference to
them,” is baseless.  Langer’s role as liaison counsel was to coordinate between class
counsel and the Court, and to assist in case management.  Langer had no power to advise
the Court or mediate disputes, nor was he afforded special access to Judge DuBois.  Cf. 
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In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 2004).  The record contains no
evidence of “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism” arising from Langer’s administrative
role as liaison counsel.
Peoples also argues that his testimony regarding an inappropriate relationship
between Langer and Judge DuBois was adequate to support an appearance of partiality
and should not have been discounted by the District Court.  Peoples gives his self-serving
testimony far too much credit.  Not only was the testimony unsupported, but it was
directly contradicted by three other attorneys, all of whom testified they never made
statements to Peoples regarding an improper relationship between Langer and Judge
DuBois.  “A charge of partiality must be supported by a factual basis,” and recusal is not
required based on “unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.”  In re United
States, 666 F.2d 690, 695, 694 (1st Cir. 1981).  Peoples’s bare allegations were
insufficient to raise objective doubts regarding Judge DuBois’s impartiality.
Finally, Peoples’s argument that Judge DuBois’s imposition of the injunctions and
purported delay in determining the contempt motion does not establish an appearance of
partiality.  A litigant’s dissatisfaction with a judge’s rulings does not support recusal. 
Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).  
In sum, we conclude that the allegations Peoples leveled at Judge DuBois at the
2007 contempt hearing were spurious.  Even worse, both Peoples and his counsel have
continued their quixotic crusade on appeal by including unsupported charges and
18
innuendo in the brief filed in this Court.  See, e.g., Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant
Peoples at 8, 28-30, 35-36, In re Linerboard Antitrust, Nos. 08-3493, 08-4453, 09-4524
(3d Cir. Mar. 23, 2009).  They persist in pressing such allegations on appeal, despite the
fact that Judge DuBois explicitly denied the allegations in his Answer to Peoples’ Petition
for Mandamus in October 2007, stating that “[t]here were no ex parte communications
between Langer and the undersigned Judge. . . . Langer has no ‘personal clout with Judge
DuBois.’”  R. 897-98.
Whether borne out of desperation or ethical lapses, we do not take lightly
Peoples’s attempts to sully the reputation of a Judge of the United States who has, after
over twenty years of distinguished service, earned a reputation for honesty and fairness. 
Such accusations, even when unfounded as they are here, can undermine the coin of the
realm of the judiciary: equal justice under the law and the public’s faith therein.  See In re
Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Indiscriminate accusations of dishonesty . .
. do not help cleanse the judicial system of miscreants yet do impair its functioning–for
judges do not take to the talk shows to defend themselves, and few litigants can separate
accurate from spurious claims of judicial misconduct.”).  Thus, while parties and lawyers
certainly have a right to challenge wayward jurists, they must do so based on facts, rather
than reckless speculation.  As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court well stated, lawyers
“ha[ve] an obligation to obtain some minimal factual support before leveling charges that
19
carry explosive repercussions.”  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Surrick, 749 A.2d 441,
449 (Pa. 2000).
VI.
The learned trial judge correctly noted that Peoples’s grievances against Langer
have unnecessarily consumed judicial resources for too long.  We commend the District
Court for the thorough and patient manner in which it has addressed the issues raised in
this litigation, particularly in the face of the spurious allegations leveled against it.
For the reasons stated herein, we will affirm the Second Order in its entirety.  In
addition, we will affirm the First Order in all respects except for the denial of civil
contempt sanctions.  We leave that issue to the sound discretion of the District Court on
remand.
